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STUDENT NOTES
LARCENY IN WEST VIRGINIA*
Realizing the difficulty of embodying all the elements of
larceny as interpreted by the adjudicated cases into one compre-
hensive definition, the West Virginia court, after citing definitions
by various recognized authorities, states that "None of these def-
nitions are believed to be perfect..."' but all agree that the same
elements enter into its composition. These factors include obtain-
ing possession of personal property, by a trespass in the taldng and
carrying away, from the possession of another, with the felonious
intent to deprive him of his ownership therein. The various in-
cidents of these factors will be presented under the headings of (1)
subject matter, (2) the asportation, (3) the trespass, and (4) the
animus f urandi.
1. Subject Matter. Declaratory of the common law is the
statutory provision that every form of personalty comprehended
in the term "goods and chattels" is subject to larceny.2 Thus there
is no difficulty in showing that ordinary goods are subject to
larceny, such as hogs,3 hens,4 horses, 5 wine,8 tires,7 saddle and
horse,8 whiskey,9 money,10 wool,11 automobile, 2 and furs.13 The dif-
ficulty arises when statutes remedial of the common law attempt to
extend the subject matter. Real property and things savoring of
realty were not subject to larceny.14  This has generally been
changed by statute, as in this state wherein such things as are "of
substance" of a freehold though "affixed thereto" are the subject
of larceny, "although there be no interval between the severing and
taking away."5
* The scope of this note does not include statutory larceny as by embezzle-
ment, false pretense, etc.
I State v. Chambers, 22 W. Va. 779, 786 (1883).
2W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 13.
S State v. Hunter, 103 W. Va. 377, 137 S. E. 534 (1927).
4 State v. Winans, 100 V. Va. 418, 130 S. E. 607 (1925).
5 State v. Heaton, 23 W. Va. 773 (1883).
6 State v. Hupp, 31 W. Va. 355, 6 S. E. 919 (1888).
7 State v. Cooper, 111 W. Va. 255, 161 S. E. 30 (1931).
s State v. Blair, 63 W. Va. 635, 60 S. E. 795 (1908).
9 State v. Bailey, 63 W. Va. 668, 60 S. E. 785 (1908).
10 State v. Robinson, 109 W. Va. 561, 155 S. E. 649 (1930).
"1 State v. Warner, 106 W. Va. 409, 145 S. E. 754 (1928).
12 State v. Powers, 91 W. Va. 737, 113 S. E. 912 (1922).
13 State v. Wiseman, 111 IV. Va. 183, 161 S. E. 437 (1931).
14 4 BL. Comm. 232.
15 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 16. At common law such
things must be first converted to chattels by a severance, then a subsequent
carrying off at another time constituted larceny. Commonwealth v. Steimling,
156 Pa. 400, 27 Atl. 297 (1893).
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To disperse any doubt that might exist at the common law and
to lower the amount which divided the offense into a misdemeanor
and felony, boats, skiffs, timber and appliances are expressly made
subject to larceny by statute.'6
Bank notes, checks, and other writings and papers of value
not subject to larceny at the common law17 have been made so by
statute.'" The papers or writings of value alleged to have been
stolen need not technically come within the express terms of the
statute."9 The value to be placed on them, is their face value, as
choses in action, and it is the value to the owner, not to the thief.2"
Though common law larceny was classified as simple or com-
pound, in West Virginia all larceny not amounting to robbery is
simple larceny,21 classified by statute as petit larceny if the value
of the goods taken is under twenty dollars, and grand larceny if
the value is twenty dollars or over.22 The market value, if any, of
stolen goods may be used to convict of grand larceny if proved as
of the time and place of the theft; and a bona fide offer to buy the
thing stolen within a few months after the larceny is admissible
to sustain a grand larceny charge, if the value has not declined."'
Where property is stolen from the same owner and from the
same place by a series of acts, whether each taking is a separate
crime or together constitute a single larceny, depends upon whether
there is a separate impulse motivating each taking, or a single im-
pulse for the entire group motivated by a general fraudulent
scheme. 24 In a relevant West Virginia case where an agent law-
fully collected small sums of money at various times and converted
lO W. VA. CODE (Michie. 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 17. Differing from the penalty
prescribed in the general larceny statute, the offense is a misdemeanor if the
value of the goods is under ten dollars and a felony if the value is above that
amount. Quaere, if the value is found to be exactly ten dollars.
17 State v. McCoy, 63 W. Va. 69, 59 S. E. 758 (1907). Such papers were
evidence of mere righ+s. Regina v. Watts, 6 Cox Cr. Cases 304 (1854).
'1 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 14.
19 Fredrick v. State. 3 W. Va. 695 (1869).
20 State v. Crumbey. 81 W. Va. 287, 94 S. E. 137 (1917). Larceny of un-
stamped, undated, and unsigned railroad and ferry tickets not available for
transportation, held not'to be grand larceny unless valuable to the conductor
as receipts, even though the thief by slight alterations could fender the tickets
valid. Only the intrinsic paper value could be shown.
21 State v. Chambers, 22 W. Va. 779 (1883). There is no longer any dis-
tinction between larceny from the person and ordinary larceny.
22 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61. art. 3, § 13.
23 State v. Boswell, 107 W. Va. 213, 148 S. E. 1 (1929). Defendant had
stolen a cow, and the owner testified that he had refused a hundred dollar offer
for it, and that the offeror was well acquainted with the local cow market.
Conviction for grand larceny reversed for failure to show that the value had
not declined in the meantime.
24 (1924) 36 C, J. § 219,
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them to his own use, it was not a distinct and independent con-
version of each sum, but the conversion of each sum as one trans-
action, a single embezzlement. The agent was tried for the em-
bezzlement of the aggregate sum of all the transactions.2 1 Where
the cashier of a bank had embezzled several small sums the court
said "the jury could well infer that the many small sums of money,
taken at various and sundry times, were taken in furtherance of,
and pursuant to, a preconceived and continuing design to appro-
priate it to his own use."
2
Under the early common law animals not fit for food, and
having no intrinsic value, were not the subject of larceny.27 Numer-
ous statutes have changed the rule especially in regard to domestic
animals, such as dogs.2 8  Dogs are made subject to taxation and
declared to be personal property "within the meaning and con-
struction of the laws of West Virginia' ,2 and unless this is con-
strued to be limited to tax purposes, then dogs may well be "goods
and chattels" subject to larceny under the statute.80
To enable the court to determine if the goods taken are the
proper subject of larceny, it is necessary to give a sufficient descrip-
tion of the goods.31 And since the common law requires an alle-
gation of ownership,3 2 it is important that the goods be capable of
ownership. An indictment for the larceny of a note "the property
of the estate of said T .... M. . . ., deceased" is defective, for "One
who is dead can not own property."33 Nor are goods the subject of
25 State v. Moyer, 58 W. Va. 146, 52 S. E. 30 (1905).
28 State v. Wetzel, 75 W. Va. 7, 18, 83 S. E. 68 (1914).
27 4 BL. Comm. 235. It is doubtful if this early principle would be followed
today. MImLER, CRmrNrAL LAw (1934) 343.
28 (1924) 36 0. J. 739.
29 W. VA. CoDE (Michie, 1937) c. 19, art. 20, § 1.
30 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 13. In the case of State v.
Blake, 95 W. Va. 467, 121 S. E. 488 (1924), on an indictment containing two
counts, the flrst count of common law grand larceny of a dog of the assessed
valuation of $75 was quashed on the ground that at common law a dog was not
the subject of larceny. However, the second count of unlawfully stealing,
taking and carrying away was held good under W. Va. Acts 1908, c. 29, § 9.a-1,
which section no longer appears in the code, and being general, rather than
local in nature, is presumably repealed by W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 63,
art. 1, § 1.
31 State v. Robinson, 106 W. Va. 276, 145 S. E. 383 (1928).
32 State v. Cutlip, 78 W. Va. 239, 241, 88 S. E. 829 (1916).
83 State v. Cutlip, 78 W. Va. 239, 88 S. E. 829 (1916) stating that ownership
may be in a living person, or the personal representative of a deceased person,
or it can be alleged to be in "persons unknown" to the grand jurors, if such
be the case.
If there is no personal representative of a deceased person, an allegation
of ownership in the widow may be sufficient. State v. Heaton, 23 W. Va. 773
(1883).
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larceny which are alleged to belong to a nonexistent corporation.34
The fact that articles are illegally possessed does not preclude
the taking thereof from being larceny, as where the defendant was
convicted of grand larceny of 339 poker chips, used for gambling."5
Under the statute which makes embezzlement "larceny", vari-
ous other properties are expressly made subject to embezzlement
and therefore larceny, including "any effects or property of any
other person" coming under the defendant's control by virtue of
his office, place or employment.3 These more properly fall within
the scope of embezzlement.
2. The Asportation. This element of larceny is clearly ex-
plained in the case of State v. Chambers,37 the first West Virginia
decision to consider the law of larceny at any length. There must
be a felonious and complete severance of the property from the
owner's possession, and the thief must have had at least for an
instant of time complete and absolute possession of the property;
and during such possession he must have feloniously removed the
same from the place it occupied just before he seized or laid hold of
it. The slightest removal from the place it occupied, even a kair's
breadth, makes the offense complete, although the whole of the
article so taken be not removed from the whole space which the
whole article occupied before it was taken. Yet if every part there-
of be removed from the space which that particular part occupied
just before the taking, such is sufficient asportation to be larceny.
Where the thief thrust his hand intothe pocket of another, seized
a pocketbook, and with the intent to steal, lifted or raised it to the
top of the pocket, and upon being detected, released his grasp.
leaving the pocketbook hanging partly out of the pocket, this is
sufficient "taking and carrying away." The thief has had a com-
plete and absolute possession and control.38
The facts in a very recent decision stated that the defendant
was arrested with his hands, clothes and shoes freshly bloodied, as
he attempted to run from a barn where three hogs, belonging to
84 State v. Ferree, 88 W. Va. 434, 107 S. E. 126 (1921). A charge in the
indictment that the goods were of the United States Railroad Administration,
D. & 0. Railroad, when such person or corporation had never been created by
act of Congress or presidential Proclamation is defective.
35 Bales v. State, 3 W. Va. 685 (1868). Each chip cost twenty-five cents,
so the intrinsic value was *ell over tw'enty dollars and thus grand larceny.
The court did not infer what valse would be used had the intrinsic value been
less than twenty dollars, though the fixed value for gambling purposes may
bc above that amount.
30 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 3, § 20.
37 22 W. Va. 779 (1883).
38 State v, Chambers, 22 W, Va, 779 (1883).
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another, had just been surreptitiously butchered. The hogs were
found lying together, closely side by side, with entrails removed.
The court said, "That situation could not reasonably have existed
unless the hogs had been shifted after they were killed", and
reiterated that a removal by a mere "hair's breadth" was sufficient,
citing the Chambers case. 9
Apparently the Chambers case has rather comprehensively
dealt with the various incidents of the asportation element, as at-
tested by the lack of larceny cases reaching the supreme court
wherein the element of asportation was a major issue.
3. The Trespass. This element must be considered in relation
to the possession of the owner of the goods stolen, and his relation
with the thief. Goods may be taken from the actual or constructive
possession of the owner,40 and there is a sufficient ownership of the
goods in a person who has only a special property in them, as a
lessee for years, a bailee, a pledgee, a carrier, etc.4 There need be
no actual violence in the trespass. 42
Larceny by trick is a doctrine well recognized at common law
and in this state. Where a person by means of some fraud or trick
procures the delivery of goods to him by the owner, with the intent
to steal at the time of the delivery, this amounts to a taking within
the definition of larceny, unless the intent was to pass title in addi-
tion to possession, and a subsequent conversion by the taker is
larceny. This is based on the theory that if the taker had the
preconceived design to convert the goods when he obtained posses-
sion, then it is implied that the taking is against the will of the
owner, hence the trespass.4
5
39 State v. Nelson, 3 S. E. (2d) 530 (W. Va. 1939).
4 State v. Bailey, 63 W. Va. 668, 60 S. B. 785 (1908); State v. DeBerry,
75 W. Va. 632, 84 S. E. 508 (1915).
41 State v. Heaton, 23 W. Va. 773 (1883). An owner of goods can be guilty
of larceny but taking his own goods from one to whom they have been pledged,
the pledgee having a special property in them until the pledgor has per-
formed the condition of the pledge. Henry v. State, 110 Ga. 750, 36 S. E. 55
(1900).
42 State v. Edwards, 51 W. Va. 220, 41 S. E. 429 (1902).
4a State v. Edwards, 51 W. Va. 220, 41 S. E. 429 (1902). This was the
first case of larceny by trick to come before the court. D and X had enticed A
into a card game playing for money, and it was pretended that A and D had
jointly won from X $2000. As a condition precedent to receiving the money,
D pretended to put up $1700, inducing A to put up $300 to total an amount
equal to X's $2000, and the $4000 was then put into a tin box, prior to dividing
it up between A and D. Later A was given the tin box to keep the money,
until D should come to A's house and make the division. A later discovered
there was no money in the box. Held, larceny by trick. A had put the money
into the box for a special and limited purpose, to add it to D's $1700 as a con-
dition precedent to an equal division by A and D, and A parted only with
possession when D, by artifice, extracted the money from the box.
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Supplementing this doctrine is the decision in a later case that
even if the owner intends to pass title when the defendant received
the goods, it may still amount to larceny if the intent is to pass
title only under specified conditions, and the goods are converted
before those conditions have been fulfilled.44
4. The Animus Furandi. In every larceny the taking must be
with a fraudulent intent. "To 'take' an article signifies 'to lay
hold of, seize or grasp it with the hands or otherwise' ". Doing the
same act, animo furandi, constitutes a felonious taking.47 But if
the defendant denies his intent to steal, the inferences to be drawn
from all the attendant circumstances, including such explanations
as he can and does make for his acts, are questions for the jury. 4
However, the taking must be without any claim of right and with
the intent to deprive the owner of it permanently, by appropriating
it to himself.47 A taking under an honest claim of right is not
larceny, even though the thief takes with knowledge of the adverse
claim of another, and his own claim proves to be untenable. 8 But
facts and circumstances indicating lack of confidence in the claim
of right under which the property was taken and carried away,
44State v. Wiseman, 111 W. Va. 183, 161 S. . 437 (1931) quoting from
(1924) 36 C. J. § 140. A delivered furs to D who said he would pay cash for
them, first requesting permission to take them to a nearby town to get the
approval of his fiancee, and that he would be back in two hours. D later re-
fused to either pay or give up the furs. Held, he became a bailee for a specified
purpose and time, i. e., the approval of his fiancee within the next two hours,
and that A had never intended to part with title until he received payment.
45 State v. Chambers, 22 W. Va. 779, 789 (1883) quoting from Gettinger v.
State, 13 Neb. 308, 14 N. W. 403 (1882).
46 State v. Cascie, 103 W. Va. 442, 137 S. E. 886' (1927).
47 State v. Cascie, 103 W. Va. 442, 137 S. E. 886 (1927). D admitted
the taking of a car but denied the intent to steal. But the court said that giving
a name other than his own when he stored the car, and also leaving town sud-
denly when he was accused of larceny, was probably a reasonable basis for the
jury's verdict of larceny. Cf. State v. Shores, 31 W. Va. 491, 7 S. E. 413
(1888). D and others, after buying, drinking, and paying for cider at a store,
returned later, ordered more cider, then left before drinking or paying for it,
because of a disturbance, and broke in later at night in the presence of others
and drank the cider. The court thought it was very probable that D thought
the cider belonged to them, though it had only been ordered, and not yet
paid for.
4s State v. Flanagan, 48 W. Va. 115, 35 S. E. 862 (1900). A deserting wife
claiming that certain fruit deposited in her husband's cellar belonged to her,
instigated D to get possession of it and ship it to her without her husband's
knowledge. D did so under the belief that it belonged to the wife, and the court
held the evidence would not sustain the verdict of larceny.
The court mentions the curious common law rule that, though a friend as-
sist a wife in carrying away her husband's property with intent to deprive him
thereof, it is not larceny on the part of the friend, unless he and the wife had,
or intended to commit adultery; and a wife in no event would be guilty of
larceny for converting her husband's goods, because at the common law the
husband and wife were but one person. Id. at 119.
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and the determination to defeat the adverse claim by putting
property beyond the reach of legal process such as concealment,
disposition, or destruction thereof, tend to prove lack of good
faith on the part of the taker.49  Thus, it must be more than a
mere colorable pretense to get possession, and whether the claim
of right is bona fide or not is a question for the jury.r0 And if a
claim of right is made, it must be to all that was taken.51 The case
of State v. Caddle2 raised the quaere: "Does a mere bona fide
claim of right to the thing itself exclude larceny, if there is no such
claim of right to do the act by which it is obtained?" Apparent-
ly this question remains unanswered.
The intent must be to deprive the owner permanently of pos-
session 53 and therefore borrowing a chattel without the owner's
consent, for temporary use and without claiming ownership is not
larceny.14  But once the crime of larceny has been committed,
restitution or abandonment of the goods is no defense."
The necessity of lucri causa, a question greatly disputed at
common law, has been settled in West Virginia. Taking goods lucri
causa, "for the sake of gain", does not form an essential element
of larceny."' In the Caddle case, whiskey was the subject matter
of the larceny, and the court said "What matters it to the owner
.... whether they took it for gain or not, so that they took it with
the intent.., by appropriating it to themselves, in order to destroy,
49 State v. Bailey, 63 W. Va. 668, 60 S. E. 785 (1908). A and 1B had do-
posited whiskey at D's distillery which was in the hands of receivers. There
being some dispute about who had title to the whiskey, D had his agent haul
away four barrels of it, claiming later he thought it belonged to him. Held,
the concealment of its whereabouts after its removal evinced guilty intent; an
attempt to defeat the adverse claim, not by establishing a superior title but by
putting the subject matter beyond the reach of the courts, and is in the nature
of an admission that the claim was groundless and untenable. (Reversed on
other grounds.)
50 State v. Bailey, 63 W. Va. 668, 60 S. E. 785 (1908); State v. Caddie, 35
NV. Va. 73, 12 S. E. 1098 (1891).
51 State v. Caddie, 35 W. Va. 73, 12 S. E. 1098 (1891). D claimed a pint and
a half of whiskey was due him, but he took two or three gallons.
52 35 W. Va. 73, 12 S. E. 1098 (1891) syl. 3. Claiming A owed him some
whiskey, D broke into A's house late in the evening and took some whiskey from
his wife, presumably at the point of a gun. By way of dictum the court said
D made no claim of right to all he took, or to the manner in which it was taken.
Hie was convicted of burglary.
53 State v. Caddle, 35 W. Va. 73, 12 S. E. 1098 (1891).
54 State v. Robinson, 106 NV. Va. 276, 145 S. E. 383 (1928). Of. the statute
making it a felony to steal a motor vehicle without denoting the offense to be
larceny. W. VA. CoDE (Michie, 1937) c. 17, art. 19, § 4.
55 State v. Chambers, 22 W. Va. 779 (1883); State v. Goldstrohm, 84 W. Va.
129, 99 S. E. 248 (1919).
56 State v. Caddle, 35 W. Va. 73, 12 S. B. 1098 (1891).
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as they did in part by pouring it out, to drink, to sell, to give away
or throw away?' 7 7 As long as there is the intent to deprive the
owner of the goods, it matters little what the motive or reason for
the theft be.
J. S. M.
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN WEST VIRGINIA
Ever a shock to the conscience of the newly-fledged law student
engaged in a perusal of Professor Williston's Cases on Contracts is
the decision rendered in Kirksey v. Kirksey.1 Defendant Kirksey
promised his widowed sister-in-law, Antillico, that he would pro-
vide a home for her and her family. Antillico, relying upon the
defendant's promise gave up government land on which she had
been living and traveling some sixty miles established a home upon
the land so generously proffered by the defendant. At the end of
two years defendant Kirksey ordered Antillico to move off the
land.
Under the strict common law consideration requirements, as
pointed out by the court in the above case, defendant Kirksey's
promise would not be binding and could be repudiated at will.
Since there had been no "bargained-for-exchange",' but only a
promise to bestow a mere gratuity, "sister Antillico", who had
relied upon the promise to her detriment, was without a remedy.
To avoid the harsh results and patent injustice compelled by
a strict adherence to the doctrine of consideration in the Kirksey
case and in similar cases the common law has in part effected an
internal reorganization. One expression of this remedial tendency
is found in the Restatement of Contracts:
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably ex-
pect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and sub-
stantial character on the part of the promisee and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.' 3
It is to be noted that "promissory estoppel", as this curative
doctrine is generally termed, applies only to promises; it does not
57 The dissenting judge argued that lucri cause is the civil law epuivalent to
the common law animus furandi, and points out that it has been accepted by
several courts as a part of the common law, and that there can be no larceny
unless some benefit was expected by the taker.
1 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
2 This term is the essence of 'Williston's explanation of consideration. See
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1927) §§ 100, 102 et seq.
3 1 RESTATEMENT, CONRACTS (1932) § 90.
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